Current Account Adjustment: Some New Theory and Evidence by Jiandong Ju & Shang-Jin Wei
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
CURRENT ACCOUNT ADJUSTMENT:









We thank Rudolfs Bems, Marcel Fratzscher, Caroline Freund, Mick Deveraux, Gordon Hanson, Jean
Imbs, Olivier Jeanne, Aart Kraay, Nuno Limao, Jonathan Ostry, David Parsley, Ken Rogoff, Eric van
Wincoop and seminar participants at Northwestern University, University of Lausanne, Graduate Institute
for International Studies in Geneva, the IMF, and the European Central Bank for helpful discussions
and suggestions, and Chang Hong, Erik von Uexkull, and Xuebing Yang for very capable research
assistance. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 2007 by Jiandong Ju and Shang-Jin Wei. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Current Account Adjustment: Some New Theory and Evidence
Jiandong Ju and Shang-Jin Wei




This paper aims to provide a theory of current account adjustment that generalizes the textbook version
of the intertemporal approach to current account and places domestic labor market institutions at the
center stage. In general, in response to a shock, an economy adjusts through a combination of a change
in the composition of goods trade (i.e., intra-temporal trade channel) and a change in the current account
(i.e., intertemporal trade channel). The more rigid the labor market, the slower the speed of adjustment
of the current account towards its long-run equilibrium. Three pieces of evidence are provided that
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the major advances in open-economy macroeconomics in the last thirty
years is the intertemporal approach to current account, developed in seminal work
by Sachs (1981, 1982) and Svesson and Razin (1983), codiﬁed in Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1996), and now taught to every graduate student in international economics.
Relative to the Mundell-Fleming model, the intertemporal approach has a micro-foundation
and can be connected to Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis. In spite of its
appeal at a conceptual level and some partial empirical support, actual current
accounts for many countries appear too smooth (i.e., do not seem to move as much as
the theory predicts) (see, for example, Roubini, 1988; Sheﬀrin and Woo, 1990; Otto,
1992; Ghosh, 1995; Ghosh and Ostry, 1995; Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 1996; and Hussein
and de Melo, 1999). The empirical failure of the classic intertemporal approach is
sometimes interpreted as a consequence of capital controls. The diﬃculty with this
interpretation is that the empirical failure occurs also with countries that arguably
have a very high degree of capital mobility (e.g., the United Kingdom, see Sheﬀrin
and Woo, 1990, and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ, 1996). In this paper, we propose a theory
of current account adjustment that nests the textbook version as a special case.
Countries with certain institutional features (to be made clear later) would naturally
have relatively smooth current accounts. We also provide some tests that shed light
on the theory’s predictions.
We argue that the setup of a single tradable-sector in a typical paper on the
intertemporal approach is not an innocuous simpliﬁcation. In particular, in an
alternative setup with two tradable sectors to be presented in this paper, any
shock that changes a country’s capital stock - which can come from an exogenous
increase in the domestic capital stock, an increase in the discount factor, or an
increase in productivity - could be accommodated by a change in the composition
of output and intra-temporal trade with no need for a current account adjustment
2(or intertemporal trade). The intuition behind this apparently major departure from
the classic exposition of the intertemporal approach can be understood by appealing
to the classic theory of (intra-temporal) trade. In the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson
model with two sectors and two factors, factor prices are equalized across countries
as long as the goods market is integrated. Even with ﬁnancial autarky (i.e., no
intertemporal trade but with free contemporaneous trade in goods), a shock to the
capital stock can be completely accommodated by a change in the composition of
output and goods trade. Instead of exporting capital directly (i.e., adjusting the
current account), a country can export capital indirectly by exporting more of the
capital-intensive product and at the same time importing more of the labor-intensive
product (i.e., adjusting the composition of the intra-temporal trade). In this case,
going from ﬁnancial autarky to free international capital mobility need not generate
any capital movement. In other words, the intertemporal trade that would have
taken place is completely substituted by a change in the composition of goods trade.1
Of course, current account does ﬂuctuate in the data; so one cannot stop here.
Can we recover the textbook predictions about a current account response to a shock
in our model with multiple tradable goods? The answer is yes if we assume that labor
is sector-speciﬁc. Intuitively, if labor is not mobile across sectors, then domestic
output composition cannot change fully in response to a shock to a country’s capital
stock. So the adjustment must go through the current account. In this case, the
current account response would resemble that described in the textbook by Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (1996). In general, if an economy’s labor market is partially ﬂexible, its
response to a shock would be a combination of a change in the current account (i.e.,
the intertemporal trade channel) and a change in the composition of output and
goods trade (i.e., the intra-temporal trade channel). The relative importance of the
current account channel depends inversely on the degree of domestic labor market
1The point on potential substitution between international trade and capital mobility is
pioneered by Mundell (1957), and discussed by Jones and Neary (1984), Markusen (1983), Markusen
and Svensson (1985), Wong (1986), and Neary (1995), among many others.
3ﬂexibility.
We note that it is not straightforward to study capital ﬂows (capital account
adjustments) in a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson framework: without costs of trade
in goods or capital, there are inﬁnite combinations of capital ﬂow and goods trade
composition that constitute equilibria. So the exact amount of capital ﬂows is
indeterminate. With costs of trade in goods and/or capital, one tends to obtain one
of two corner solutions: the adjustment to a shock is either entirely through a change
in the goods trade and nothing through capital ﬂows, or only through capital ﬂows
with no change in the composition of goods trade. In this paper, we introduce labor
market rigidity in addition to costs of trade and capital ﬂows. The costs of trade and
capital ﬂows deliver a unique solution, and labor market rigidity eﬀectively generates
decreasing returns to scale at the sector level and moves the equilibrium away from
the two corners toward an interior solution. This interior solution potentially helps
to explain both the “missing trade” puzzle (i.e. the factor content of goods trade
is too small relative to the prediction of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, see Treﬂer,
1995) in the trade literature, and the “too smooth current account” puzzle in the
open-economy macroeconomics literature.
The model presented in this paper diﬀe r si na ni m p o r t a n tw a yf r o mt h em o r e
standard generalization of adding a non-tradable sector to the bare-bones intertemporal
approach to current account. In models with non-tradable and tradable sectors,
frictions in the domestic labor market impede resource reallocation between the
non-tradable and tradable sectors. Since, with a single tradable good, one cannot
decouple goods trade from current account changes, the more rigid the domestic
labor market, the less the current account responds to a shock. This is shown
through calibrations by Fernandez de Cordoba and Kehoe (2000) and others. In
contrast, since our model allows for a separation between a change in the mix of the
goods trade and a change in the current account, it delivers an opposite prediction.
A change in the current account and a change in the composition of two tradable
4sectors are substitutes. Therefore, an increase in domestic labor market rigidity that
reduces resource reallocation between the two tradable sectors, must increase, rather
than reduce, the size of the current account response. Assuming that the distribution
of the underlying shocks is the same for all economies, a testable implication of our
model is that the variance of the current account is positively associated with the
degree of domestic labor market rigidity across countries. We report some empirical
evidence that suggests that our channel dominates in the data.
The theory presented in this paper is related to an empirical literature in open-economy
macroeconomics that estimates the speed of adjustment of the current account
towards the long-run equilibrium (Milesi-Ferretti and Razin, 1998; Freund, 2000;
Freund and Warnock, 2005; and Clarida, Goretti, and Taylor, 2005). This line of
research typically ﬁnds that the current account has a tendency to regress back
to its long-run equilibrium, with a speed of adjustment that is heterogenous across
countries. The reason behind the mean reversion property and especially the cross-country
heterogeneity in the adjustment speed is usually unexplained in the existing studies.
Our theory provides a micro-foundation to understand these patterns. In the very
short run, every economy can be thought of as being represented by a speciﬁc-factor
model in which labor does not move between sectors. A shock manifests itself in
a change in the economy’s current account. In the long run, the economy can be
represented by a Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson setup in which all factors are perfectly
mobile. The same shock is absorbed by a change in the composition of goods
production and trade with no change in the current account. The transition from
the short run to the long run generates the mean reversion in current account. The
time it takes for an economy to move from the very short run to the long run can
be assumed to be proportional to its labor market rigidity. If the degree of labor
market ﬂexibility is diﬀerent across countries, so is the convergence speed of current
account.
The empirical part of the paper provides three types of results. First, we
5report evidence that an economy’s frequency in the adjustment of the goods trade
composition is linked to its labor market rigidity. This is a necessary but not
suﬃcient condition for our story. Second, we examine a time-series implication of
our theory: current account is mean-reverting, and the adjustment (to its long run
equilibrium) is slower in a country with a more rigid labor market. We implement
our empirical test in two steps: (a) estimating a speed of current account adjustment
country by country; and (b) relating the adjustment speed to labor market rigidity.
The result is supportive of our prediction. Third, we report evidence that a country’s
current account (relative to total trade) is more variable if its labor market is more
rigid. We interpret it as suggesting that economies with a more rigid labor market
have a larger current account response to the same set of underlying shocks.
The large country case represents an interesting twist. Since one country’s
current account surplus must be the rest-of-the-world’s current account deﬁcit, for
a large country, its current account adjustment depends not only on its own labor
market institutions, but also on those of the other countries. We show theoretically
that, even if a large country has a completely ﬂexible labor market (but the rest
of the world does not), part of its response to a shock has to take place through
a change in its current account (which is diﬀerent from the case of a small open
economy).
This paper is related to the literature on dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin models
pioneered by Oniki and Uzawa (1965), Bardhan (1965), Stiglitz (1970), and Deardorﬀ
and Hanson (1978). Other contributions in recent years include Chen (1992), Baxter
(1992), Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), Bond, Trask and Wang (2003), and
Bajona and Kehoe (2006). Most closely related to our paper is one by Ventura
(1997), which studies trade and growth with a model of one ﬁnal good, two intermediate
goods, and labor-augmenting technology. While this literature tends to focus on the
question of income convergence across countries, current account adjustment is not
typically studied (and a balanced trade is often assumed). Our paper is also related
6to speciﬁc factor models in the trade literature. Jones (1971), Mayer (1974), Mussa
(1974), and Neary (1978 and 1995) are some of classic papers. The tradition in the
trade literature is to assume that capital is sector speciﬁc but labor is fully mobile.
We choose to focus on rigidity in labor market. Collective bargaining and laws
that make it diﬃcult for ﬁrms to ﬁre workers could impede labor mobility across
sectors. More generally, both labor and capital may be speciﬁci nt h ev e r ys h o r t
run and become more ﬂexible over time. In our context, frictions in the capital
market impede both the access to the international capital market (which reduces
the reliance on current account adjustment) and the reallocation of capital between
tradable sectors within the economy (which increases the reliance on current account
adjustment). Therefore, with these two opposing eﬀects, the linkage between the
capital market imperfection and the pattern of current account adjustment is not
clear cut. We therefore ﬁnd it useful to emphasize labor market rigidity.
We organize the rest of the paper in the following way. Section 2 presents
an overlapping-generations version of a multi-sector, two-factor, and ﬂexible labor
market model. Section 3 introduces labor market rigidity to the model. The labor
market institution is parameterized in such a way that the speciﬁc-factor model
and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model are special cases of the formulation.
The last part of this section discusses how the large-country case may diﬀer from
the small-country case. Section 4 presents some empirical work examining the
relationship between domestic labor market institution and patterns of current
account adjustment. Finally, Section 5 concludes and points to directions for future
research.
2 An Overlapping-Generations, Multi-Sector Model
We use an overlapping-generations model to illustrate the idea. After setting up
the model, we ﬁrst discuss how the domestic interest rate under both trade and
7ﬁnancial autarky would respond to various shocks. The point is to demonstrate that
the model behaves in the same way as the textbook version of the intertemporal
approach; nothing unusual goes on here. However, when we allow for free trade
in goods but retain ﬁnancial autarky, the model deviates substantially from the
textbook predictions. In particular, shocks to the economy are absorbed through
changes in the composition of output and goods trade with no change in the domestic
interest rate. In this case, moving from ﬁnancial autarky to ﬁnancial openness would
not generate any current account response to any of these shocks.
We start with a closed-economy case. Each individual is assumed to live for
two periods, young and old. Lt individuals are born in period t. There is no
population growth; thus Lt = Lt−1 = L. Each individual supplies one unit of labor
when she is young, and zero when she is old, and divides the labor income when
young between her ﬁrst period consumption and saving. In the second period, the




t be the consumption in period t of young and old individuals.




t+1), 0 <β<1 (1)
where β is time-preference factor.
Let wt be the wage rate per unit of labor at period t,a n drt+1 the interest rate
from period t to period t +1 . The endowment at period t is labor Lt, and capital
stock Kt which equals the total saving from the previous period. Lt and Kt are used
to produce two intermediate goods X1t and X2t, which in turn are used to produce
ac o m p o s i t eﬁnal good Yt. The ﬁnal good is then used for both consumption and
investment. We assume that intermediate good 1,X 1t, is labor intensive, while
X2t is capital intensive. The ﬁnal good is taken as the numeraire whose price is
normalized to 1.








The consumer maximizes utility (1) subject to the budget constraint (2). Substituting














t+1 as functions of (wt,r t+1,β). An individual’s saving is s(wt,r t+1,β)=
wt − C
y
t (wt,r t+1,β). Thus, total saving in period t is given by
St(wt,r t+1,β,L t)=[ wt − C
y
t (wt,r t+1,β)]Lt (4)
In equilibrium St equals Kt+1, the capital stock in period t +1 .C
y
t (wt,r t+1,β)
decreases as rt+1 increases. Thus St(wt,r t+1,β,L t) is an increasing function of rt+1.
2.1 Production
The production setting assumed in this paper is close in spirit to that in Ventura
(1997). While international capital ﬂows (or intertemporal trade) are prohibited
by assumption in his model, we not only allow for intertemporal trade but make
it a central focus of the discussion. The market is perfectly competitive. The
production function for the ﬁnal good is Yt = G(X1t,X 2t). The production function
for intermediate good i(= 1,2) is Xit = fi(AtLit,K it) where At measures labor
productivity, which is exogenous and identical in both sectors.2 Hit = AtLit
can be understood as eﬀective labor. All production functions are assumed to be
homogeneous of degree one. We assume no depreciation of capital for simplicity.
2One could introduce the productivity parameter in a diﬀerent way, e.g., making it Hicks-neutral
in the ﬁnal good, Yt = AtG(X1t,X 2t). None of the major results are aﬀected.




,r t)=m i n {wtLit + rtKit | fi(AtLit,K it) ≥ 1}





Hit + rtKt | fi(Hit,K it) ≥ 1} (5)
We denote qt = wt/At as the wage rate for one unit of eﬀective labor thereafter.
Free entry ensures zero proﬁt for the intermediate goods producers. We assume
that the country’s endowment is always within the diversiﬁcation cone so that both
intermediate goods are produced. In period t +1we have:
p1,t+1 = φ1(qt+1,r t+1) and p2,t+1 = φ2(qt+1,r t+1) (6)
where pi is the price of intermediate good i. Note that labor and capital are both
used to produce intermediate goods. The full employment conditions for labor and
capital are, respectively,
a1Lt+1X1,t+1 + a2Lt+1X2,t+1 = Lt+1 (7)
a1Kt+1X1,t+1 + a2Kt+1X2,t+1 = Kt+1 (8)
where aiLt+1 =
∂φi(qt+1,rt+1)
At+1∂qt+1 and aiKt+1 =
∂φi(qt+1,rt+1)
∂rt+1 are labor and capital usages
per unit of production at t +1 , respectively.
The proﬁt maximization for ﬁnal good producers requires that
p1,t+1 = G0
1(X1,t+1,X 2,t+1) and p2,t+1 = G0
2(X1,t+1,X 2,t+1) (9)
which implies
G(X1,t+1,X 2,t+1)=p1,t+1X1,t+1 + p2,t+1X2,t+1 (10)
= wt+1Lt+1 + rt+1Kt+1 (11)
10Equation (10) is due to homogeneous of degree one of f(.) and implies zero proﬁt
for the ﬁnal good producers. Equation (11) is due to zero proﬁt for the intermediate
goods producers and implies that supply equals demand in the ﬁnal good market.
Equations (6)- (9) are a system of Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework.
For a given vector of product prices (p1,t+1,p 2,t+1), factor prices (qt+1,r t+1) are
determined by (6). Given factor prices, endowment vector (Lt+1,K t+1) then determines
the output vector (X1,t+1,X 2,t+1) through equations (7) and (8). Finally, product
prices (p1,t+1,p 2,t+1) and sector output are also linked by the market clearing condition
(9) for the products. All the key propositions of the HOS model are valid here. In
particular, Samuelson’s factor price equalization theorem holds: If the product prices
(p1,t+1,p 2,t+1) are the same across countries, the eﬀective wage rate, qt+1, and the
interest rate, rt+1, must also be equal across countries.
If Kt+1 increases, the Rybczynski theorem implies that the capital intensive
output X2,t+1 increases, while the labor intensive output X1,t+1 decreases. Thus the
market price of X2,t+1,p 2,t+1, declines, while p1,t+1 increases. Using the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem, the return to capital, rt+1, declines, while the eﬀective wage rate qt+1
increases. Thus, r(Lt+1,K t+1) as a solution to the above system is a decreasing
function of Kt+1. The inverse function of this,
Kt+1 = I(Lt+1,r t+1)=r−1(Lt+1,r t+1) (12)
deﬁnes the investment function. Since the wage rate wt+1 = At+1qt+1, an improvement
in the (labor-augmenting) productivity increases the wage rate proportionally. However,
the interest rate rt+1, and the investment function r−1(Lt+1,r t+1) are not aﬀected
by a change in the technology At+1.
112.2 The Interest Rate under Trade and Financial Autarky
The equilibrium interest rate in period t +1 ,r t+1, is determined by the saving
function (4) (the supply of capital) and the investment function (12) (the demand
for capital). This can be represented graphically by a Metzler diagram in Figure 1A
that has saving and investment on the horizontal axis and the interest rate on the
vertical axis. The upward-sloping SS curve represents the saving function and the
downward-sloping II curve represents the investment function. The equilibrium
investment Kt+1 and the interest rate rt+1 are determined by the intersection
between the SS and II curves. We consider four cases of comparative statics under
autarky (with no goods trade or international capital ﬂows), namely, increases in:
(a) the capital stock in period t, (b) the time preference, (c) the productivity shifter
in period t and (d) the productivity shifter in period t+1, respectively. The objective
is to show that our model under both trade and ﬁnancial autarky behaves in the
same way as the textbook model with one tradable sector. There is nothing unusual
so far. This is to be contrasted later with the case of ﬁnancial openness when our
model departs from the textbook model substantially.
2.2.1 Change in Capital Stock Kt
Consider an exogenous increase in the capital stock in period t (possibly due to an
infusion of international aid). We apply the standard HOS analysis to equilibrium
conditions (6) - (9). The increase in Kt results in a reduction in the interest rate rt
a n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h ee ﬀective wage rate qt. Thus, wage rate in period t, wt = Atqt,
increases.






As wage income wt increases, s(wt,r t+1,β) increases. Therefore, in Figure 1a, the
saving curve SS shifts out, while the investment curve II remains unchanged. The
equilibrium moves from E to C and rt+1 declines.
122 . 2 . 2 C h a n g ei nT i m eP r e f e r e n c eβ
An increase in β in period t means that individuals have become more patient
and would like to consume less in period t but more in the next period. Thus,
s(wt,r t+1,β)=
Ct+1(wt,rt+1,β)
1+rt+1 increases and the saving curve SS shifts out. Since
the demand for capital or the investment curve II in t+1is not aﬀected, rt+1 falls.
2.2.3 Change in Productivity
Consider ﬁrst an increase in At. In response, wt = Atqt must increase proportionally.
Thus, the saving curve SS in period t +1shifts out, while the investment curve II
in period t +1is not aﬀected. As a result, rt+1 declines.
Consider next an increase in At+1. In our setup, this has no eﬀect on the wage
income in period t, and therefore no eﬀect on the saving curve SS. As we discussed
before, in this labor-augmenting setup, an increase in At+1 has no eﬀect on the
investment curve II either. Thus, rt+1 does not change.
2.3 A Frictionless Open-Economy
Let us now consider the open-economy case in which the world consists of two
countries, home and foreign, and allow for both intratemporal and intertemporal
trade. Intratemporal trade takes place when a country exports the good of its
comparative advantage and imports the good of its comparative disadvantage, whereas
intertemporal trade takes place when a country lends capital (or runs a current
account surplus) to another country in one period and collects the capital back with
interest (or runs a current account deﬁcit) in a future period.
Note that in the textbook exposition of the intertemporal approach, when there
is only one tradable sector, only intertemporal trade is feasible (i.e, no intratemporal
trade). For comparison, we ﬁrst discuss how our model would work if intratemporal
trade in the intermediate goods is artiﬁcially banned. Assume that the two countries
are identical to begin with, and then the home country is hit by a shock that increases
13Kt,β ,A t or At+1, respectively. All foreign variables are denoted by a “*”. The
current account balance is illustrated in Figure 1. As we discussed in the last section,
an increase in either Kt,β ,or At would shift the saving curve in period t +1out
from SS to S0S0, while the investment curve II remains unchanged. The post-shock
home autarky interest rate, rA0
t+1, is at point C and less than that of abroad at
E∗, rA∗
t+1. Thus, if only intertemporal trade is allowed, the world interest rate r is
above rA0
t+1 but below rA∗
t+1. Home would run a current account surplus in period t,
and foreign would run a deﬁcit. These results resemble exactly those in Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (1996). An improvement in the future technology At+1 is only slightly
diﬀerent. In the textbook treatment, this shifts out both the saving curve SS and
the investment curve II so the net eﬀect on the interest rate is ambiguous. In
our model, an increase in At+1 has no eﬀect on either the saving curve SS or the
investment curve II, and therefore no eﬀect on the interest rate.
Suppose we now allow for free trade in intermediate and ﬁnal goods, but ban
intertemporal trade. We will see that our model’s results can be dramatically
diﬀerent from those in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996). The intratemporal trade in
t h ei n t e r m e d i a t ea n dﬁnal good equalizes the product prices across countries in
every period. That is, pit = p∗
it. As equation (6) and the counterpart in foreign
country indicate, factor prices (qt,r t) are determined by the prices of intermediate
goods (p1t,p 2t) so we must have
qt = q∗
t and rt = r∗
t (13)
in every period t. Consider now opening up the economy for international capital
ﬂows. With equal interest rates in both countries, there is no incentive for intertemporal
trade.
This is basically Samuelson’s factor price equalization theorem. The underlying
reason for the diﬀerence between our setup and that in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996)
14is that an extra channel for adjustment to shocks - through intratemporal trade in
the intermediate goods - has been opened up. In particular, in response to a shock
that increases the home country’s capital stock, the home country can increase
the production and export of the capital intensive intermediate good (i.e., exporting
capital indirectly through intratemporal trade), instead of exporting capital directly
(i.e., through a current account adjustment).
This idea can be illustrated by the Metzler diagram shown in Figure 1. From
the previous section, a shock that augments the home country’s capital stock would
shift out the home saving curve from SS to S0S0.L e t IeIe and Ie∗Ie∗ be the
investment curves at home and abroad under free intratemporal trade, respectively.
As Home produces more capital intensive good now than under autarky, and Foreign
produces less, the home investment curve IeIe in Figure 1A shifts out, but the foreign
investment curve Ie∗Ie∗ in Figure 1B shifts in. The intratemporal trade moves the
domestic equilibrium from C to G, and the foreign equilibrium from E∗ to G∗. The
interest rates after the intratemporal trade are equalized in the two countries.
The following proposition summarizes our discussion:
Proposition 1 In a frictionless world, intratemporal trade in the intermediate goods
equalizes interest rates across countries in every period. As a result, there is no
incentive for intertemporal trade.
2.4 Multiple Equilibria
Going from trade/ﬁnancial autarky to an open economy, zero intertemporal trade
(or zero capital ﬂow) is a possible equilibrium but not the only one. To see this,
we use a graphical representation of an integrated world economy from Dixit and
Norman (1980) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). In Figure 2, O and O∗ represent
the origins for home and foreign countries, respectively. Vectors OX1 and OX2
represent the world employment of capital and labor in intermediate Sectors 1
and 2 in the equilibrium of the integrated world economy. Intratemporal trade
15equalizes product and factor prices across two countries. Let E be the distribution







from origin O∗. The full employment conditions in home country,
(7) and (8), determine the domestic employment of labor and capital in Sectors
1 and 2,O Aand OB, respectively. O∗A∗ and O∗B∗ are their foreign-country
counterparts. Note that any distribution inside the parallelogram OX1O∗X2 is a
possible equilibrium if both labor and capital are mobile internationally. If labor is
not internationally mobile (which we will assume throughout the paper), all points
on line TT∗ are equilibria. For example, point E0, is one of the feasible equilibria,
where home lends EE0 amount of capital to foreign, and produces OA0 and OB0.
Multiple equilibria implies indeterminacy. To achieve a unique equilibrium, we
consider ﬁrst costs of goods trade together with costs of capital ﬂows. This by
itself would result in a complete specialization in either intratemporal trade or
intertemporal trade. We regard this as unsatisfactory as it is not consistent with
the data. Our preferred solution is to relax the assumption of perfect labor mobility
within a country in addition to consider costs of trade and capital ﬂows. We will
discuss this case in Section 3.
2.5 Adding Costs to Goods Trade and Capital Flows
In an inﬂuential paper by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000), trade costs are used to explain
the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, as well as ﬁve other major puzzles in international
ﬁnance. It is argued that “trade costs can create a wedge between the eﬀective real
interest rates faced by borrowers and lenders,” and “it is precisely such incipient
real-interest-rate eﬀects that keep observed current-account imbalances within a
modest range.” (Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 2000, pp. 341) In this section, we introduce
costs of trade into our multiple-sector model and study the eﬀect of trade costs on
current account. As we will see, our results are very diﬀerent from those of Obstfeld
and Rogoﬀ (2000).
16Consider the case in which a shock increases the domestic capital stock at t +1
in a world with two otherwise identical countries. That is, Kt+1 >K ∗
t+1.H o m ei s
capital abundant, importing the labor-intensive intermediate good 1 and exporting
the capital-intensive intermediate good 2. We assume an iceberg transportation cost
τ: for every unit of home (foreign) good shipped abroad, only a fraction 1−τ arrives.





and p2t+1 =( 1− τ)p∗
2t+1 (14)
For simplicity, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for both intermediate




t+1 where α1 >α 2. Rewrite the zero proﬁt





























We also assume an iceberg cost of capital ﬂow, ρ. Hence, capital ﬂows from home




< (1 − ρ) (17)
Combining (16) and (17), we conclude that there would be no capital ﬂows (intertemporal
trade) if the trade cost is small relative to the cost of capital ﬂows, in the sense that
τ<1 − (1 − ρ)
α1−α2
α1+α2 (18)
In this case, any cross-country interest rate diﬀerential would be driven down suﬃciently
by trade in intermediate goods so that no international capital ﬂows (or intertemporal
17trade) would take place.
On the other hand, if τ>1 − (1 − ρ)
α1−α2
α1+α2 , there would be capital ﬂows (from
home to foreign country). Note that as long as there exists intratemporal trade, (16)
always holds and rt+1 < (1 − ρ)r∗
t+1. In this case, capital would cross the national
border until the capital/labor ratios in the two countries become identical so that
intratemporal trade is eliminated. This is essentially Mundell’s (1957) argument that
intertemporal trade (capital ﬂows) and intratemporal trade are complete substitutes.
The notion of trade costs includes transport cost, tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers.
Costs of capital ﬂows include costs associated with exchange controls, foreign countries’
taxes on international investment, and premia for currency and political risks in
international ﬁnancial investment. Given the strong home bias on observes in
international ﬁnancial investment, it is entirely possible that the cost of international
capital ﬂows is enormous for many countries. The following proposition summarizes
our discussion.
Proposition 2 Introducing costs of trade and costs of capital ﬂow produces a unique
equilibrium but at one of the two corners. If the trade cost is small relative to the
cost of capital ﬂows in the sense that τ<1 − (1 − ρ)
α1−α2
α1+α2 , then the economy’s
adjustment to shocks takes place entirely through intratemporal trade in intermediate
goods (i.e., no current account response). On the other hand, if the trade cost is
large relative to the cost of capital ﬂows, then the adjustment to shocks takes place
entirely through intertemporal trade (or a current account response).
By construction (with only one tradable sector), Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000)
rule out the substitution between intratemporal trade and capital ﬂows. In their
model, a higher transportation cost raises incipient real interest diﬀerentials and
therefore increases the cost of borrowing/lending (i.e., current account adjustment),
which reduces the current account imbalance. In contrast, in our model, there
would be no incentive for international capital ﬂows if the trade costs were zero,
18since the intratemporal trade in goods would have indirectly realized exports (or
imports) of capital. Higher costs of trade would reduce intra-temporal trade and
raise intertemporal trade. Thus, our model produces an opposite result from that
in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ with regard to the eﬀect of trade costs on the size of
current account. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2000) report a negative empirical correlation
between current account surplus and real domestic interest rate and interpret that
as supportive evidence for their theory. However, the negative correlation is also
consistent with our model except that the direction of causality is reversed.
3 A Model with Labor Market Rigidity
We now turn to a model that allows for labor market rigidity. In the framework
described in Section 2.5, it is assumed that capital and labor can be costlessly
and instantaneously reallocated between sectors within a country. We now relax
this assumption. In particular, we introduce some labor market frictions and show
that international capital ﬂows and goods trade are no longer complete substitutes.
Generally speaking, in response to a shock, an economy’s adjustment involves a
combination of intratemporal trade (i.e., changes in the composition of goods trade)
and intertemporal trade (i.e., borrowing or lending on the international capital
market).
The timing of the model is as follows. The economy is in a steady state in period
t. At the beginning of period t +1 , young individuals at t +1have made career
choices in terms of which sector to work in. Lit+1 is hired in sector i at time t +1 ,
and the capital stock is Kt+1. Then a shock (e.g., a change in Kt,β ,or At)h i t s
the economy. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the cost of goods trade is
small relative to the cost of capital ﬂows (in the sense that inequality (18) holds)
so that no capital moves across countries in period t. Goods trade is assumed to be
balanced initially. Since trade in intermediate goods suﬃciently narrows the interest
19rate diﬀerential between the countries, initially zero capital ﬂow in equilibrium does
not imply that the capital/labor ratios are identical in two countries. The home
country - to be hit by a shock - is assumed to be capital abundant both before and
after the shock. If home is a small country, it is shown that capital will ﬂow from
home to foreign countries in period t although the home country exports the capital
intensive good at the same time. At the end of this section, we will relax the small
country assumption and discuss the large country case.
3.1 Current Account Adjustment in a Small Country
Let home be a small country which takes world prices (p1t,p 2t) as given. When labor
is perfectly mobile across sectors, our model would coincide with the HOS setup
discussed in Section 2.5. Domestic factor prices (q0
i,t+1,r0
i,t+1) would be determined
by (15) both before and after a shock. If labor is assumed to be attached to the
sectors, on the other hand, this becomes a speciﬁc-factor model. A shock that
increases the capital stock would reduce the ﬁnancial-autarky level of domestic
interest rate, but would raise the wage rate. Moreover, the wage rate in the
capital-intensive sector 2, w0
2,t+1, would be higher than that in the labor intensive
sector 1, w0
1,t+1. Output in both sectors would increase. In the textbook exposition of
classic trade theories, the speciﬁc-factor model is viewed as a short-run equilibrium,
and the ﬂexible-labor-market HOS model represents the long run equilibrium. In
the transition from the short run to the long run, labor (and capital) move from the
labor-intensive sector to the capital-intensive sector. Once reaching the long run,
factor prices go back to (q0
i,t+1,r0
i,t+1), and the capital-intensive output increases, but
the labor intensive output decreases, in accordance with the Rybczynski theorem.
Between these two polar cases, there are various levels of partial labor market
rigidity. To parameterize the degree of labor market ﬂexibility, we assume that when
a unit of labor moves from one sector to another, it would earn only λ fraction of
the wage in the new sector. 1−λ fraction of the wage income is lost (due to moving
20costs). A higher λ represents a more ﬂexible labor market. At the one extreme,
λ =1represents the HOS model (in which labor market is completely ﬂexible);
at the other extreme, λ =0represents the speciﬁc-factor model (in which there is










individual intending to move from the labor-intensive sector 1 to the capital-intensive
sector 2 would see a decline in her wage income. As a result, no labor relocation
takes place, and wage rates would stay at (w0
1,t+1,w0
2,t+1). So the entire range of









in sector 1 would ﬁnd it worthwhile to move to sector 2 until w1,t+1 = λw2,t+1.T h e
relationship between the degree of labor market ﬂexibility and the post-shock wage

















2,t+1, a (moderate) change in the labor market ﬂexibility






Let fi(At+1Li,t+1,K i,t+1) be the production function for intermediate good i.
We drop the subscript t +1in the rest of this subsection for simplicity. Note that















H1 + H2 = AL, and K1 + K2 = K0 (21)
Equation (19) states that the marginal products of capital in two sectors are equal,
while equation (20) is the condition that w1 = λw2.
21As discussed by Neary (1978), physical and value factor intensities, Ki
Li and rKi
wiLi,
may diﬀer when w1 6= w2, which could generate paradoxical results in comparative
statics. To simplify the analysis and avoid these paradoxes, we will assume a










where α1 >α 2. Therefore, sector 1 is more labor intensive than sector 2 in both
physical and value senses.
We are now ready to discuss the open-economy case. Let the home country be
capital abundant after the shock so that the country imports (the labor-intensive)
good 1 and exports (the capital-intensive) good 2. Intra-temporal trade in the
intermediate goods implies that p1 =
p∗
1
1−τ and p2 =( 1 − τ)p∗
2. The iceberg cost
of capital ﬂo w si ss t i l ld e n o t e db yρ. However, the ﬁnancial-autarky level of the
interest rate diﬀerential is no longer governed by equation (16). Since labor market
rigidity results in decreasing returns to scale at the sector level, intertemporal and
intratemporal trade coexists in the equilibrium.
We assume that condition (18) holds in equilibrium before the shock. By
assumption, as the domestic interest rate, r0, is greater than (1 − ρ)r∗ but less
than r∗/(1 − ρ), there are no capital ﬂows crossing national borders before the
shock. Consider a shock that increases the domestic capital stock from K to K0.
We ﬁrst examine two polar cases of labor market ﬂexibility, and then discuss the
more general case of an intermediate level of labor market ﬂexibility.
If λ =1(perfectly ﬂexible labor market), with trade openness but ﬁnancial
autarky, factor prices are determined by the zero proﬁt conditions given by (15) and
the domestic interest rate stays at r0 after the shock. Going from ﬁnancial autarky
to ﬁnancial openness, there is no incentive for capital to ﬂow out (or in). In other
words, all the adjustment to the shock goes through the channel of intratemporal






2t+1 (highly rigid labor market), with trade openness but ﬁnancial
autarky, labor is sector speciﬁc and there are decreasing returns to scale at the sector
level. The domestic interest rate falls after the shock. If the shock is suﬃciently
large, the post-shock domestic interest rate, r0, dips below (1 − ρ)r∗, l e a d i n gt oa
capital outﬂow. It can be easily veriﬁed that, without the cost of capital ﬂows, the
entire shock to the capital stock, ∆K = K0 − K, would ﬂow out and would restore
the interest rate to the long run level r0. Moderately positive costs of capital ﬂows
would modify this slightly. Thus, the movement of the current account in this case
resembles that of the textbook version of the intertemporal approach.




2 <λ<1, the ﬁnancial-autarky
equilibrium is described by equations (19), (20), and (21). For notational convenience,
each variable is denoted by a superscript λ and the equilibrium is labelled as the
λ-economy. A set of comparative statics, to be used later for our main results, are
summarized in the following lemma. A formal proof is relegated to the appendix.






∂λ < 0, ∂rλ
∂λ > 0, and ∂rλ
∂K < 0.
When the labor market is partially rigid, some labor moves from sector 1 to
sector 2 in response to a shock, with an associated adjustment of capital between
the two sectors as well. The amounts of labor used in two sectors, Hλ
1 <H 1 and
Hλ
2 >H 2, are determined by the wage rate equation (20). The interest rate is now
between the two polar cases, r0 <r λ <r 0. The more ﬂexible the labor market, the
closer the interest rate to r0. If the shock is suﬃciently large, the ﬁnancial-autarky
level of interest rate becomes rλ < (1 − ρ)r∗, resulting in a capital outﬂow under
ﬁnancial openness. As capital ﬂows out, rλ increases, while the wage rate diﬀerential
wλ
2 − wλ
1 shrinks so that wλ
1/wλ
2 >λ . This implies that labor in sector 1 does not
23ﬂow to sector 2 while capital ﬂowing out. Therefore, the λ-economy is eﬀectively the







respectively. As we again have decreasing returns to scale, capital will ﬂow out until
the domestic interest rate reaches (1 − ρ)r∗. Since rλ >r 0 under ﬁnancial autarky,
only a part of ∆K = K0 − K ﬂows out under ﬁnancial openness. In other words,
a change in the current account is only a part of the adjustment in response to the
shock; the remaining adjustment must go through a change in the composition of
goods trade.




2 <λ<1, the interest rate is determined by the labor market ﬂexibility parameter
λ, and the capital stock employed in the home country K00. That is, rλ = rλ(λ,K00)=
r(λ,K0 − B). Thus, the amount of capital outﬂow is determined by
rλ(λ,K0 − B)=( 1− ρ)r∗ (23)
Diﬀerentiating equation (23), we obtain the result that the size of the current account









We summarize our results by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 Consider a small-open economy with labor market ﬂexibility indexed
by λ. When a shock increases the capital stock (by a suﬃcient size to overcome the
cost of capital ﬂows) in the country, it experiences an outﬂow of capital (i.e., runs
a current account surplus). The more ﬂexible the labor market (i.e., the bigger is
λ), the smaller the current account response.
A graphical illustration in Figure 3 may help us to understand the above analysis.
The length of the horizontal axis is equal to the total supply of capital. The
24vertical axis measures the interest rate. The value marginal product of capital
curves in sectors 1 and 2, labeled as V1 and V2, respectively, are plotted relative
to origins O1 and O2. The equilibrium position before a shock is shown by E0
where V 0
1 = p1∂f1(H0
1,K 1)/∂K1 and V 0
2 = p2∂f2(H0
2,K− K1)/∂K2 intersect. A
shock that increases the capital stock from K to K0, shifts origin O2 to the right
to O0
2 by ∆K = K0 − K. Correspondingly, V 0













2. The interest rate decreases from r to r0, while capital employed in sector
1, K1, increases from K0
1 to K1
1. At the constant product prices, the wage rate in
each sector must increase, with a greater proportion in the capital intensive sector.
In the long-run (which can be thought of as λ =1 ), factor prices are restored to
the long-run equilibrium level, (q0,r0). Using Rybczynski theorem, the output of
the labor intensive sector must fall. That is, both V1 and V2 shift to the left and





2 <λ<1, the equilibrium of the λ-economy, Eλ, is between the
speciﬁc-factor equilibrium E0 and the long run equilibrium EL.V
0




2,K0 − K1)/∂K2 and V 0




Figure 3 since Hλ
1 <H 0
1 but Hλ
2 = AL − Hλ
1 >H 0
2. As labor market becomes less





1 will shift to the left further. The interest rate rλ increases as λ increases so that
r0 <r λ <r 0.
We assume that the shock (∆K = K0 − K) is suﬃciently large so that rλ <




2 t ot h el e f ti nF i g u r e3 . A sc a p i t a lﬂows out, the home interest rate increases,
w h i l ew a g er a t ed i ﬀerential shrinks. This implies that labor in each sector sticks to
Hλ
i as capital ﬂows. In equilibrium the capital employed by home country is reduced
to K00 and V
λ
2 shifts to the left to V 00
2 = p2∂f2(Hλ
2,K00 − K1)/∂K2 which intersects
25V
λ
1 at E00; the interest rate is equal to (1 − ρ)r∗.
By similar reasoning, a country runs a current account deﬁcit in response to
a shock that temporarily reduces the country’s capital stock. Moreover, the size
of the current account deﬁcit is inversely related to the degree of domestic labor
market ﬂexibility. As the labor market approaches perfect ﬂexibility (λ → 1), the
current account response to a shock approaches zero (since all adjustment takes
place instantaneously through a change in the composition of goods trade). This
discussion, however, assumes that the country is a price-taker in the world market.
We consider next the case of a large country.
3.2 Current Account Adjustment in a Large Country
As the capital stock increases from K to K0 at home, the relative supply of the labor
intensive good to the capital intensive good, X1/X2, declines. As a result, the world
relative price of good 1, p1/p2, increases. Therefore, in the foreign country, sector 1
expands relative to sector 2 and the wage rate in sector 1, w∗
1, is higher than that
in sector 2, w∗
2. The counterparts of equilibrium conditions (19), (20), and (21) in

































2 = A∗L∗, and K∗
1 + K∗
2 = K∗ (27)
Labor market rigidity in the foreign country, λ∗, diﬀers from that at home. Moreover,
cross-sector factor adjustments in the two countries go in opposite directions. Sector
2 expands at home due to the increase in the capital stock, but sector 1 expands in
the foreign country due to an increase in the world market relative price of good 1.
Equation (26) represents w∗
2 = λ∗w∗
1 and is the reverse of the equation (20). The









where Xi(p1,p 2) is the derived demand for intermediate good i i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,
which is the inverse function of equation (9), and X∗
i (p1,p 2) is its counterpart in
the foreign country.
First consider intratemporal equilibrium without capital ﬂows. Ten endogenous




2,p 1, and p2 are determined by ten
equations (19), (20), (21), (25), (26), (27), (28), (29). By comparing the domestic
interest rate r, which is determined by K1/H1, with the foreign interest rate r∗,
which is determined by K∗
1/H∗
1, we can determine the direction of capital ﬂow.
Now let Kf b et h ea m o u n to fc a p i t a lﬂow (intertemporal trade) between the
countries. The equilibrium intratemporal and intertemporal trade is then determined
by the ten equations described above, replacing domestic and foreign capital stocks,












A closed form solution is not possible without some further simplifying assumptions.
The comparison between r and r∗, which depends on the levels of labor market
rigidity both at home and abroad, is complicated, too. Fortunately, for one interesting
special case we are able to determine the adjustment pattern to a shock. Speciﬁcally,
if the domestic labor market is perfectly mobile (λ =1 ) , but the foreign labor market
is rigid (λ∗ < 1), we are able to compare the ﬁnancial autarky levels of domestic
and foreign interest rates and the qualitative results of Proposition 3 remains.
27Using Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the increase in p1/p2 reduces the interest rate
at home when labor is perfectly mobile. In the foreign country, the increase in p1/p2
reallocates factors from the capital intensive sector to the labor intensive sector. As
one unit of labor moves from sector 2 to sector 1, more capital would be released in
sector 2 t h a nc a nb ea b s o r b e di ns e c t o r1 if capital intensities in both sectors were
to remain constant. Therefore, as a consequence of the labor adjustment, capital
intensities must rise in both sectors. The rigid labor market in the foreign country,
however, prevents a required labor adjustment and therefore an increase in capital
intensities (a decrease in the interest rate) to the full scale. Therefore, without any
cross-country capital movement, the foreign interest rate would be higher than the
domestic interest rate. If the shock is suﬃciently large, the interest rate diﬀerential
between two countries would exceed the cost of capital ﬂows. With capital mobility,
the home country runs a current account surplus in period t.
Intuitively, for a country to avoid using the current account to adjust to a shock,
it has to do all the adjustment through a change in the composition of goods trade
(exporting more the capital-intensive good and importing more the labor-intensive
good). For a large country (e.g., the United States) to be able to do that, the rest of
the world would have to do the reverse (adjusting its output mix and composition of
goods trade in the opposite direction). Any lack of labor market ﬂexibility in the rest
of the world would prevent it from adjusting the output mix and the composition of
goods trade fully. As a consequence, the large country with a perfectly ﬂexible labor
market would have to adjust to a shock at least partly through its current account
if the labor market in the rest of the world is not perfectly ﬂexible. We state the
result as follows and relegate a formal proof to the Appendix.
Proposition 4 Consider a two-country world (i.e., both countries are large) in
which the labor market is perfectly ﬂexible at home (λ =1 ) but somewhat rigid in
the foreign country(λ∗ < 1). When a shock increases the capital stock in the home
country, the home country runs a current account surplus in period t.
28This proposition suggests that the relationship between labor market ﬂexibility
and current account adjustment for a large country is qualitatively diﬀerent from
a small country. For a small country, the more ﬂexible the domestic labor market,
the smaller the current account response to a shock. But this feature may not hold
for a large country.
4 Some Empirical Evidence
In this section, we investigate three questions empirically for small open economies.
First, does the ﬂexibility of a country’s labor market correspond to the frequency
of adjustment in the composition of its goods trade? Second, does labor market
rigidity slow down the speed of convergence of an economy’s current account to
its long-run equilibrium? Third, is a rigid labor market associated with a greater
variance of the current account relative to total trade in goods and services?
These three questions are inter-related. In our theory, ﬂexibility of domestic
labor market aﬀects an economy’s ability to change the composition of goods trade
rather than its current account to accommodate a shock. Hence, a necessary
condition for our story to work is that ﬂexibility in a country’s labor market should
be reﬂected in the ﬂexibility of its trade structure. We note, however, this is not a
suﬃcient condition for our story as other theories could also be consistent with this
pattern.3
The second question examines an implication of our theory for the dynamics of
the current account. While our model does not explicitly study the transition from
the short run to the long run, we impute an interpretation about the transition
from two comparative statics results in the model. In the very short run, a given
economy may be represented by a speciﬁc-factor model. According to our theory,
the adjustment to a shock takes place entirely through a change in the current
account. In the long run, the economy can be represented by a Hescher-Ohlin setup
3See, for example, Cunat and Melitz (2007).
29with a ﬂexible labor market. According to our theory, the eﬀect of the shock is
absorbed entirely by a change in the composition of goods trade, and the current
account returns to long-run equilibrium level.4 Following the theory by Kraay and
Ventura (2000), we will not impose the restriction that the current account in the
steady state is zero and let it be country speciﬁc instead. This reasoning generates
the predictions that current account is mean-reverting and that current account
adjustment is slower if domestic labor market is less ﬂexible. For the active empirical
literature that estimates the mean reversion property of the current account (and
ﬁnds cross country diﬀerences in the speed of current account convergence), our
theory can be thought of as a micro-foundation.
The third question we examine is an implication of our theory for the cross-country
pattern in the variance of current account (net trade) relative to total trade (exports
plus imports). Any economy is subject to various shocks all the time, most of which
are not measured and recorded systematically. In the absence of an exhaustive
catalogue of all the relevant shocks, we assume that the distribution of the shocks is
the same for all economies over a long enough time period. Under this assumption,
our theory implies that the more rigid the labor market, the more likely the eﬀects
of these shocks show up in the movement in the net trade (current account) rather
than the movement in the total trade. In other words, a lower ﬂexibility in the
labor market may be associated with a greater variance of current account relative
to total trade.
It is tempting to think that any impediment to a reallocation of capital and labor
between sectors within an economy would slow down the current account adjustment
or increase the variance of the current account relative to the total trade. In other
words, our theory may be as much about how capital market rigidities could aﬀect
4To make it formal, we assume that e
−λT denotes the fraction of the wage income that is lost
when a unit of labor moves from one sector to another within a time period T. In the short run
(T =0 ), the entire wage income would be lost, so no work would wish to move. In the long run
(T = ∞), no wage income is lost, so the model becomes the HOS setup. The current paper does
not consider an endogenously determined T, which is left for future research.
30the pattern of current account adjustment. This, however, may not be the case.
Consider credit market constraints (an inability to borrow funds quickly from banks
or capital market) faced by small and medium-sized ﬁrms. Suppose a favorable
s h o c kh i t sa ne c o n o m yt h a tw o u l dm a k ei tp r o ﬁtable for ﬁrms in a particular sector
to expand. The inability for these ﬁrms to borrow funds quickly due to credit market
constraints prevents a quick adjustment in the composition of goods trade. This
may lead one to think that the economy would have to turn to the current account
to do the adjustment. However, current account adjustment is about borrowing
and lending vis a vis the international capital market. If small/medium-sized ﬁrms
cannot borrow funds quickly at home due to the credit market constraints, it is
equally likely that they cannot borrow funds quickly from the international capital
market. In this example, imperfections in the credit market impede both the access
to the international capital market (i.e., the use of current account to accommodate
a shock) and the reallocation of capital between sectors within the economy (i.e.,
the use of intra-temporal trade to adjust to the shock). Therefore, the linkage
b e t w e e nc r e d i tm a r k e tc o n s t r a i n t sa n dt h epattern of current account adjustment is
ambiguous.
4.1 Labor Market Rigidity and Trade Structure Flexibility
We ﬁrst examine whether domestic labor market rigidity aﬀects the churning of trade
structure (i.e., the average change in the composition of exports and imports over
time). Recent empirical trade studies suggest that working with highly disaggregated
sectoral data is important as most of the adjustment in capital-labor ratio likely
takes place within a ﬁnely deﬁned sector rather than across sectors. For example,
Schott (2004) documented that China and France (as examples of developing and
developed countries) often appear to export the same set of products to the U.S.
(according the US customs’ classiﬁcation of products). However, as their products
appear to have diﬀerent unit values, they are likely to be of diﬀerent varieties. Since
31China and France have very diﬀerent capital-to-labor ratios, this suggests that much
of the diﬀerence in factor content is reﬂected in diﬀerent specialization between
China and France within a common sector rather than across diﬀerent sectors. The
implication for us is that we need to work with the most disaggregated data possible.
Absent a satisfactory way to compute the churning of capital/labor ratio in exports
and imports, we compute the degree of churning for exports and imports (for any
reason) country by country, using most disaggregated data available on exports and
imports from the United Nations’ Comtrade database at the HS 6 digit level.5
To be precise, Let sX(j,h,t) = the share of product h in country j’s exports in
year t,a n dsM(j,h,t) = the share of product h in country j’s imports in year t.










where t = 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004, and T =5 . The churning index is
bounded between zero (no change in trade structure) and 2 (maximum possible
change). The value of the trade structure churning index is reported in Column
3 of Table 1. Since agriculture, dairy farming, and ﬁshery activities (agriculture
for short) are generally diﬃcult to switch in and out of, we have also computed a
churning index excluding these activities and reported it in Column 4 of Table 1.
The index for labor market rigidities comes from the World Bank Investment
Climate Assessment (ICA) based on an enterprise survey conducted by the World
Bank in 2003.6 Speciﬁcally, it is the proportion of managers/survey respondents
5It would have been useful to also examine churning of the output structure across countries.
Unfortunately, the most disaggregated data set on sectoral output, the UNIDO database, has less
than 100 sectors. This level of disaggregation is far below that of the trade data we are using here
(which has over 5000 sectors at HS 6-digit).
6http://iresearch.worldbank.org/InvestmentClimate. The data were used in the World Banks’
World Development Report 2005.
32in a country who report labor regulation as a major business constraint (out of 18
categories listed on the questionnaire, including quality of infrastructure, macroeconomic
instability, tax rate, tax administration, corruption, and crime. Each respondent
can report multiple categories as major constraints.) This measure of labor market
rigidity is preferable to simply coding the labor market regulations on the book,
since the strength of enforcement varies widely across countries. A strong law that
is not well enforced is not as binding for ﬁrms as a weaker regulation that is strictly
enforced. Since survey responses presumably take enforcement into account, the
ICA index can be regarded as a de facto measure of labor market rigidity. In any
case, the labor market rigidity index is presented in Column 5 of Table 1.
A scatter plot of the trade structure churning index (for all sectors) against the
labor market rigidity index is reported in Figure 4. A negative association between
the two is evident: countries with a more rigid labor market are more likely to
have a low churning of their trade structures. With a t-statistics of -1.75, the slope
coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level. Brazil is an apparent
outlier on the lower right part of the graph. If one removes Brazil, the new slope
coeﬃcient is still negative; but with a t-statistics of -1.60, it is only diﬀerent from
zero at the 15% level. If we remove agriculture, dairy, and ﬁshery activities from
the computation of the trade churning index, the new scatter plot is presented in
Figure 5. The negative slope coeﬃc i e n ti sm o r es i g n i ﬁcant (at the 1% level with a
t-statistic at -2.11) than Figure 4. After removing Brazil, the slope coeﬃcient is still
negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level (with a t-statistic at -1.94). To summarize,
the data suggest that domestic labor market rigidity aﬀects the speed of turnover
of an economy’s trade structure.
This result is after all not surprising: one would think that impediments to labor
reallocation should necessarily slow down the adjustment in the trade structure. In
that sense, Figures 4 and 5 can also be read as a conﬁrmation that the measure of
labor market rigidity captures useful information about the actual operation of the
33labor markets in these economies.
4.2 Labor Market Rigidity and Current Account Convergence Speed
We now turn to the second piece of empirical evidence. One may consider the index
of labor market rigidity as representing the length of the time it takes for a given
economy to make the transition from the short run to the long run. Our theory
then predicts that the speed of convergence of the current account (scaled by GDP)
to the long run equilibrium increases with the ﬂexibility of domestic labor market.
Before we present our empirical results, we ﬁrst make a note of the existing
empirical literature in open-economy macroeconomics that examines the mean reversion
property or estimates the speed of convergence of the current account towards
long-run equilibrium (Milesi Ferretti-Razin, 1988; Freund, 2000; Freund and Warnock,
2005; and Clarida, Goretti, and Taylor, 2005). These estimations are often done for
a single or a small number of developed countries and tend to be done without a
theoretical microfoundation. Our theory can be regarded as a possible microfoundation
for such estimations.
Our own empirical work follows a two-step procedure. In step one, for every
country in the sample, we estimate a speed of convergence of current account to GDP
ratio towards the steady state. This estimation utilizes the time series information
c o u n t r yb yc o u n t r y .I ns t e pt w o ,w er e l a t et h es p e e do fc o n v e r g e n c et oac o u n t r y ’ s
degree of labor market rigidity. This steps is done for a cross section of countries.
We explain the two steps in turn.
4.2.1 Estimating the Speed of Convergence for Current Account
Let x(j,t) be the ratio of country j’s ratio of current account to GDP in time t,
or, x(j,t)=ca(j,t)/gdp(j,t). Using ∆ to denote ﬁrst diﬀerence of a variable, we
estimate
34∆x(j,t)=α(j)+β(j)x(j,t − 1) + e(j,t) (31)
for the period 1980-2005. Under the null hypothesis that the current account as a
share of GDP does not converge, β(j)=0 . Under the alternative hypothesis that
the ratio of current account to GDP converges to a long-run steady state, β(j) is
negative (and smaller than one in absolute value). The greater is β(j) in absolute
value, the faster is the speed of convergence. Note that this speciﬁcation does not
impose the constraint that the long-run value of the current account-to-GDP ratio
should be zero. The country-speciﬁc long-run value in this speciﬁcation is given by
−α(j)/β(j). The idea that diﬀerent countries may have diﬀerent long-run values is
consistent with Kraay and Venture (2000).
Our theory suggests that large economies’ current accounts could behave systematically
diﬀerently from smaller ones as foreign labor market ﬂexibility also aﬀects them.
In the empirical tests, we exclude large economies, deﬁned as those whose GDP
accounts for more than 5% of world GDP. Consequently, the United States, Japan
and Germany are excluded from the sample.
The estimation is done at both quarterly and annual frequencies. Data on current
account and GDP come from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database.
Potential serial correlations in the error term is mopped up by higher orders of
the lags of the dependent variable (We will later consider a non-linear speciﬁcation
that allows for faster convergence when the current account is suﬃciently far away
from its long-run equilibrium level). We now turn to the second step of our empirical
design, namely, relating the estimated speed of current account convergence to labor
market rigidity.
354.2.2 Relating the Adjustment Speed of Current Account to Labor
Market Rigidity
Let R(j) be an index of country j’s rigidity of labor market, or a measure of the
diﬃculty in ﬁring or hiring workers. We relate a country’s speed of current account
adjustment to its labor market rigidity as follows:
β(j)=c + γR(j)+u(j) (32)
Under the null hypothesis that current account adjustment is not related to labor
market rigidity, γ =0 . Under the alternative hypothesis that a more rigid labor
market leads to a slower adjustment in current account, γ>0 (recall that β(j)sa r e
non-positive).
We now turn to the basic results from estimating Equation (32). As a ﬁrst step,
we estimate the speed of current account convergence country by country using
quarterly data on the ratio of current account-to-GDP. There are 30 countries for
which we simultaneously have quarterly CA data and a measure of labor market
rigidity. These regression results are not reported to save space. As a second step,
we implement the simplest possible bi-variate linear regression exploring any linkage
between a country’s speed of current account convergence and its labor market
rigidity. The result is reported in Column 1 of Table 2. The slope coeﬃcient
is 1.06 and statistically signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the notion that the
current account convergence is systematically slower in countries with more rigid
labor markets.
The convergence speed for current account could be aﬀected by factors other than
labor market rigidity. Unfortunately, the literature does not provide much guidance
on this, and most empirical estimation on current account convergence uses only
univariate time series. Since a key beneﬁto faﬂexible exchange rate regime is
supposed to provide a country with a better insulation from external shocks, one
36might think that exchange rate regime matters for the speed of adjustment. It is
well recognized that a country’s self-declared (de jure) exchange rate regime does
not often describe its actual behavior well (Frankel and Wei, 1994). We therefore
add a de facto exchange rate regime classiﬁcation a la Reinhart and Rogoﬀ (2004).
Speciﬁcally, a country in a given time period is classiﬁed into one of six regimes: a
peg to a foreign currency, a crawling peg, a managed ﬂoat, a ﬂo a t ,f r e ef a l l i n g ,a n d
dual exchange rates. Since our regression is a cross-section, we assign an exchange
rate regime classiﬁcation to a country if it spends a majority of the time in that
regime during the sample period. The regression result is reported in Column 2 of
Table 2. It turns out that the exchange rate regime designations are not statistically
signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcient on labor market rigidity is basically unchanged (with a
point estimate of 1.17 and still being statistically signiﬁcant).
In addition, one might think that the level of economic development (or the
quality of public institutions) can aﬀect the speed of adjustment. So we also include
per capita GDP (in logarithm) as a control variable. The result is reported in
Column 3. It turns out the level of development does not play a signiﬁcant role in
the current account adjustment either.
We have tried other variations: merging various ﬂexible exchange rate regimes
into one, using an alternative measure of de facto exchange rate classiﬁcation a la
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003). These results are reported in the last four
columns of Table 2. In all these cases, the coeﬃcient on labor market rigidity remains
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This suggests that the pattern
that a more rigid labor is associated with a slower current account adjustment is
robust.
The results so far use quarterly data. However, because annual data on current
account/GDP ratio have fewer missing observations than quarterly data, we can
work with a larger set of countries. Table 3 reports a set of regressions that relate
the current account adjustment parameters estimated using annual data with labor
37market rigidity. The same pattern emerges: a more rigid labor market is associated
with a systematically slower speed of current account adjustment. Now, however,
the coeﬃcient on per capita GDP is signiﬁcant as well: the current account adjusts
faster in poorer countries on average. The coeﬃcients on the exchange rate regime
classiﬁers are still insigniﬁcant, though the negative sign on various ﬂexible regime
dummies is consistent with the notion that current account adjusts faster in countries
with a ﬂexible exchange rate regime. To check if this result is driven by any outlier,
Figure 6 plots the estimates of β(j) (speed of current account convergence) against
R(j) (labor market rigidity). The ﬁgure suggests a robustly positive relationship
that is unlikely to be driven by one or two outliers.
4.2.3 Current Account Adjustment Speeds Estimated from a Non-linear
TAR Model
As Freund and Warnock (2005) and Clarida, Goretti, and Taylor (2005) suggest,
the speed of current account adjustment is likely to be non-linear, with faster
adjustment for larger initial deviations from the long-run equilibrium. To take
this into account, we now estimate the speed of current account adjustment by a
threshold autoregressive (or TAR) model.
The TAR model allows the CA/GDP ratio to follow a unit-root process (i.e.,
no convergence) if its value stays within a certain range but reverts to its long-run
equilibrium when the CA/GDP ratio exceeds some threshold values. To be more
speciﬁc, the CA/GDP ratio in the TAR model is assumed to come from the following
data generating process,
∆x(j,t)=α1(j)+β(j)x(j,t − 1) + e(j,t) if |x(j,t − 1)| >φ (j)
= α2(j)+e(j,t) otherwise (33)
38where α1(j), α2(j), β(j),a n dφ(j) are parameters to be estimated (for every
country j in the sample). In practice, the estimation is done in sequence. The
value of φ(j) is determined by a grid search. As O’Connell and Wei (2002) note, if
transaction costs or other factors create a zone of non-converging current account,
the TAR model provides a more powerful way to detect global stationarity than the
linear AR speciﬁcation — even if the true behavior of CA/GDP does not conform to
the TAR speciﬁcation.
Estimation of these models can be done via maximum likelihood or sequential
conditional least squares. Franses and van Dijk (2000) demonstrate the equivalence
of the two methods. Procedurally, we estimate the pooled model using the ﬁxed
eﬀects panel estimator by performing a grid search over possible values of φ.S t a r t i n g
with an initial value of φ at 0.003, the search adds 0.003 in each successive round
until φ reaches the 75th fractile of the distribution of x(j,t − 1).
After we obtain estimates of β(j) from a TAR model country by country, we
again connect them with the countries’ level of labor market rigidity. The results
are presented in Tables 4-5 (when the convergence speeds for CA/GDP are estimated
with quarterly and annual data, respectively). The coeﬃcients on the measure of
labor market rigidity are positive in all speciﬁcations and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10% level in 13 out of 14 cases. This again conﬁrms the notion that more labor
market rigidity is associated with slower convergence for CA/GDP to its long-run
equilibrium. In Table 5, there is some evidence that the convergence is faster for
countries with a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, or lower level of income.
4.3 Volatility of Current Account-to-Total Trade Ratio
Rather than looking at the speed of convergence, another way to gauge a country’s
reliance on current account to adjust to shocks is to look at the standard deviation
of the country’s CA/total trade ratio. Under the assumption that the distribution
of the underlying shocks is the same across countries, our theory predicts that an
39economy’s current account becomes more volatile if its domestic labor market is
more rigid.7 In this subsection, we compute this standard deviation, country by
country, using the time series over the period 1980-2005. We then regress it on the
measure of labor market rigidity, plus control variables. To be precise, let std(j)=
standard deviation of CA/total trade for country j, R(j) be its labor market rigidity,
and Z(j) be a vector of other controls, then the speciﬁcation is:
std(j)=c + γR(j)+ηZ(j)+u(j) (34)
The proposition that a country with a more rigid labor market tends to rely more
on its current account (relative to total trade) to adjust to shocks is interpreted as
implying γ>0. Since both real and nominal shocks could aﬀect CA/total trade
directly, we include the standard deviation of log CPI and standard deviation of log
GDP (scaled by the mean of log GDP) as control variables. In addition, we allow
exchange rate regimes to have a direct eﬀect on the variability of the CA/total trade
ratio.
The regression results are presented in the ﬁrst four columns of Table 6. The
estimates for γ are consistently positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent
level. The estimates are consistent with the interpretation that labor market rigidity
aﬀects a country’s relative reliance on its current account to do the adjustment to
shocks. The variability of log CPI is also positively related to the variability of
current account (unsurprisingly). A ﬂoating exchange rate regime also tends to
be associated with more current account variability. Perhaps, surprisingly, GDP
variability is not positively associated with current account variability.
A scatter plot of std(j) against R(j) in Figure 7 suggests that Brazil and
Nicaragua may be outliers. We exclude these two countries and re-do the regressions.
T h er e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nt h el a s tf o u rc o l u m n so fT a b l e6 .W i t ht h i sm o d i ﬁcation
7Bluedorn (2005) examines, for a set of small island economies in the Caribbean, current account
responses to hurricanes. As we do not have measures of labor market rigidity for most of these
economies, we do not adopt the idea here.
40of the sample, the variability of the current account/GDP ratio is now positively
associated with the variability of log GDP (but no longer with log CPI). Most
important for us, the positive and statistically signiﬁcant association between the
variability of the CA/GDP ratio and labor market rigidity appears to be robust to
excluding possible outliers.
Taking together the various pieces of evidence, the data strongly suggest that a
country’s current account adjustment is closely linked to its labor market ﬂexibility
in a way that is consistent with the model in this paper.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes a theory of current account adjustment that places domestic
labor market institutions front and center. In particular, an economy’s adjustment
to a shock generally involves a combination of an intratemporal channel (a change
in the composition of goods trade) and an intertemporal channel (a change in net
capital ﬂows). When labor is sector speciﬁc (which can be regarded as the very short
run), all adjustment for a small open economy takes place through capital ﬂows (and
the model behaves like the textbook version of an intertemporal approach). When
labor is completely mobile within an economy, any shock can be accommodated
by a change in the output and trade composition with no change in the current
account. A relatively more rigid labor regulation slows down the transition from
the short run to the long run, and therefore slows down the speed of convergence
for the CA/GDP ratio.
Three pieces of empirical evidence are presented. First, a rigid labor market
makes an economy less nimble and more likely to experience a low churning of its
trade structure. Second, a higher rigidity of the labor market reduces the speed of
convergence of the current account. And third, a country with a rigid labor market
is likely to exhibit a higher variance of current account to total trade. These patterns
41are consistent with the theory’s predictions.
This paper represents a ﬁrst attempt to explore how domestic labor market
institutions can aﬀect the substitution between intra-temporal trade adjustment and
current account adjustment. Many topics in the standard intertemporal approach to
current account, such as the role of ﬁscal policy, non-tradable sector, and asymmetric
information, have not been explored in this paper. It would naturally be interesting
to rethink each of these topics in our theoretic framework and to re-examine the
data if appropriate. We leave these for future research.
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6A p p e n d i x
In this appendix we prove Lemma 1 and Proposition 4.
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :
Substituting (21) into (19) and (20) and diﬀerentiating these two equations with





































































Substituting (37) and (38) into (35) and (36) and solving for ∂K1
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w2 = λ since α1 >α 2 and w1 = λw2. Thus, ∆3 < 0,
which implies that Φ < 0. Using (39), we have ∂K1
∂λ < 0, and then (35) implies that
∂H1
∂λ < 0.
We now turn to the sign of ∂r


































∂λ < 0. Note that r = p1
∂f1(1,K1/H1)
∂K1 . So ∂r
∂λ > 0.
Finally we prove ∂r
∂K < 0. Suppose that labor does not move across two sectors
















which implies that ∂K1
∂K > 0. As K declines, K1 decreases and so that K1/H1




Now diﬀerentiating zero proﬁt conditions p1 =( w1/A)












So w1/w2 increases as r increases. Thus w1/w2 >λwhen capital ﬂows out, which
implies that labor in sector 1 will not ﬂow to sector 2. That is, as capital ﬂows out,
labor does not move across sectors and r increases, which proves ∂r
∂K < 0.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 :
Rewrite equations (25) and (26) as






























Comparing r = p1
∂f1(1,K1/H1)





1 is equivalent to comparing
K1/H1 with K∗
1/H∗
1. Let λ =1in (41) and (42). Solving for Ki/Hi, we have
K1/H1 = k1(p1,p 2,1). We start from the case that τ =0 . Using (43) and (44), we
solve for K∗
i /H∗
i and have K∗
1/H∗
1 = k1(p1,p 2,λ ∗). Note that the function forms of
K1/H1 and K∗
1/H∗
1 are the same when λ =1 .S ow eh a v e :
K1/H1 − K∗
1/H∗




(1 − λ∗) (45)
where λ∗ < e λ<1. To determine
∂k1(p1,p2,h λ)
∂λ , we create an artiﬁcial small foreign
economy which takes world prices as given and has a labor market with rigidity e λ.
Equilibrium conditions in the artiﬁcial economy are the same as (43) and (44) but
47replacing λ∗ by e λ. Diﬀerentiating equilibrium conditions in the artiﬁcial economy
























Using (40) and noting that w∗
2 = e λw∗
























∂h λ > 0. Applying this result to (45), we have
K1/H1 >K ∗
1/H∗
1. Thus, r<r ∗ at τ =0 . Now let λ∗ be constant, but τ varies.
Using similar argument, we can further show that r∗ |τ>0>r ∗ |τ=0>r .As τ is
relatively large, the capital ﬂows from the home country to the foreign country at
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Figure 4: Trade Structure Churning vs Labor Market Rigidity, All Sectors 
The slope coefficient (standard error) = -0.009 (0.005), t = -1.75 
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Figure 5: Trade Churning vs Labor Market Rigidity, Excluding Agriculture 
The slope coefficient (standard error) = -0.0056 (0.0026), t = -2.11 
Excluding Brazil, the slope coefficient (standard error) = -0.0065 (0.0034), t = -1.94  















































CZE  CZE 
EST 












0  20 40 60
Labro Market Rigidity
Fitted values Convergence speed of CA/GDP Annually 
Convergence speed of CA/GDP vs. Labor Mkt Rigidity 
 
Figure 6: Convergence Speed of CA/GDP vs Labor Market Rigidity 
(based on Column 1 of Table 3; Convergence speed estimated with annual data) 
The slope coefficient (standard error) = 1.012 (0.350), t = 2.90 
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Figure 7: Standard Deviation of (CA/Total Trade) vs Labor Market Rigidity 
The slope coefficient (standard error) = 13.71 (6.51), t = 2.11  
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ALB Albania  1.57  1.10  4.90 
ARM Armenia  0.84  0.61  2.35 
AZE Azerbaijan,  Rep.  of  1.86  0.85  1.40 
BGD Bangladesh  1.18  0.95  10.80 
BGR Bulgaria  1.24  0.81  7.80 
BLR Belarus  0.96  0.68  6.35 
BRA Brazil  0.79  0.54  56.90 
CHN China  0.76  0.64  20.70 
CZE Czech  Republic 0.76  0.65  9.55 
DZA Algeria  0.82  0.44  12.90 
ECU Ecuador  1.02  0.52  14.10 
EGY Egypt  1.13  0.69  28.10 
ESP Spain  0.53  0.39  11.80 
EST Estonia  1.33  1.04  11.50 
GEO Georgia  1.73  0.96  5.80 
GRC Greece  0.82  0.54  7.70 
GTM Guatemala  0.92  0.53  16.70 
GUY Guyana  1.31  0.82  10.60 
HND Honduras  1.88  0.92  14.20 
HRV Croatia  0.91  0.69  4.20 
HUN Hungary  0.97  0.83  8.80 
IDN Indonesia  0.98  0.73  25.90 
IND India  0.85  0.57  16.70 
IRL Ireland  0.88  0.78  9.60 
KAZ Kazakhstan  0.71 0.44  1.65 
KEN Kenya  1.24  0.55  22.50 
KGZ Kyrgyz  Republic  1.86  1.09  3.50 
KHM Cambodia  0.79  0.71  5.90 
KOR Korea  0.80  0.66  4.10 
LKA Sri  Lanka  0.95  0.72  25.60 
LTU Lithuania  1.15  0.80  8.70 
LVA Latvia  1.12  0.88  3.80 
MDA Moldova  1.49  0.71  6.70 
MDG Madagascar  1.69  0.90  14.80 
MLI Mali  1.48  1.12  3.90 
MYS Malaysia  0.79  0.68  14.50 
NIC Nicaragua  1.29  0.64  6.90 
PAK Pakistan  0.40  0.30  15.00 
PHL Philippines  1.09  0.92  24.70 
POL Poland  0.75  0.58  21.55 
PRT Portugal  0.63  0.52  18.10  
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ROM Romania  0.94  0.76  12.25 
SEN Senegal  1.75  0.58  16.30 
SLV El  Salvador  0.93  0.60  3.90 
SVK Slovakia  1.00  0.80  6.00 
SVN Slovenia  0.70  0.57  3.60 
SYR Syrian  Arab  Republic 0.61  0.30  33.80 
THA Thailand  0.81  0.69  11.40 
TUR Turkey  0.84  0.67  10.45 
UGA Uganda  1.50  0.67  10.80 
UKR Ukraine  1.23  0.76  6.15 
VNM  Vietnam  No data  No data  10.90 
ZAF South  Africa  0.81  0.65  32.90 




1. Trade Structure Churning Indexes are computed by the authors using most disaggregated 
data available on exports and imports from the United Nations’ Comtrade database at the HS 
6 digit level. Let s
X(j, k, t) = share of product k in country’s exports in year t, and s
M(j, k, t) = 
share of product k in country j’s imports in year t. Then the Trade Structure Churning Index 
for country j, or Churning(j) for short, is defined by 
 
Churning (j) =  1/T ∑t ∑k [ |s
X(j, k, t) -  s
X(j, k, t-2)| + |s
M(j, k, t) -  s
M(j, k, t-2)| ] 
 
Where t = 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004, and T=5. The churning index is bounded 
between zero (no change in trade structure) and 2 (maximum possible change). 
 
Column 3 is computed using data for all HS sectors. Column 4 is computed excluding HS 
Chapters 1-29 (i.e., excluding agriculture, dairy, fishery and related sectors). 
 
2. Labor Market Rigidity (Column 5) refers to the fraction of managers who report labor 
regulations as either a major business constraint or a severe business constraint in a World 
Bank Investment Climate Assessment survey conducted in 2002. This should be regarded as 
a de facto measure of labor market rigidity.  
  55 
 
 
Table 2: Labor Market Rigidity and Convergence Speed of CA/GDP      
(with Convergence Speed Estimated with Quarterly Data, Controlling for Seasonality)    
    b1Q b1Q  b1Q b1Q  b1Q  b1Q  b1Q 
Labor market rigidity   1.063 1.174  1.16  1.214  1.192  1.108  1.077 
   (0.536)* (0.615)* (0.621)*  (0.562)* (0.566)*  (0.575)*  (0.585)*
Exchange rate: crawling peg     -0.173  -0.217  -0.173  -0.219       
      (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.20)       
Exchange rate: managed float     -0.206  -0.212             
      (0.25)  (0.25)             
Exchange rate: float     (dropped) (dropped)            
                       
Exchange rate: free falling     -0.257  -0.239             
      (0.21)  (0.21)             
Exchange rate: dual market     -0.182  -0.177             
      (0.41)  (0.41)             
         -0.24  -0.229        Exchange rate: managed float, float, free falling 
or dual market           (0.19)  (0.19)       
Exchange rate: float                 -0.184  -0.153
                  (0.14)  (0.15) 
Exchange rate: intermediate                 0.004  0.041 
                  (0.18)  (0.20) 
Log GDP / capita [10,000US$]        0.109     0.112     0.071 
         (0.14)     (0.13)     (0.13) 
Constant  -0.57  -0.405  -0.437  -0.408  -0.441 -0.491 -0.54 
   (0.090)* (0.179)* (0.185)*  (0.171)* (0.177)*  (0.111)*  (0.144)*
Observations  30 30  30 30  30  30  30 
R-squared  0.12 0.18  0.2  0.17 0.2 0.2  0.21 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%          
The dependent variable is a country-specific regression coefficient for an AR process with lags that characterizes the speed of 
convergence of the current account to its long run equilibrium 
The exchange rate regime classifications used in columns 2-3 and 4-5 are based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). In columns 4-5, 
their last three classifications are combined. The exchange rate classifications in column 6-7 are based on Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) 
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Table 3: Labor Market Rigidity and Convergence Speed of CA/GDP     
(with Convergence Speed Estimated with Annual Data)        
 b1A  b1A  b1A  b1A  b1A  b1A  b1A 
Labor market rigidity   1.012 1.228  1.258 1.133 1.151  0.969  1.031 
   (0.350)* (0.407)* (0.396)*  (0.381)* (0.371)* (0.383)* (0.367)* 
Exchange rate: crawling peg     0.063  0.024  0.056  0.015       
      (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.11)       
Exchange rate: managed float     -0.048  -0.036             
      (0.12)  (0.12)             
Exchange rate: float     (dropped)  (dropped)            
                       
Exchange rate: free falling     -0.115  -0.096             
      (0.12)  (0.12)             
Exchange rate: dual market     -0.235  -0.245             
      (0.29)  (0.28)             
         -0.061  -0.037        Exchange rate: managed float, float, 
free falling or dual market           (0.11)  (0.11)       
Exchange rate: float                 -0.028  -0.003 
                  (0.08)  (0.08) 
Exchange rate: intermediate                 0.043  0.07 
                  (0.12)  (0.11) 
Log GDP / capita [10,000US$]        0.155     0.162     0.184 
         (0.086)*     (0.086)*     (0.081)* 
Constant  -0.689 -0.7  -0.747  -0.692  -0.745 -0.678 -0.76 
   (0.059)* (0.092)* (0.093)*  (0.096)* (0.097)* (0.070)* (0.076)* 
Observations  49 47  47 47 47  47  47 
R-squared  0.15 0.21  0.27 0.18 0.25  0.16  0.25 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%         
The dependent variable is a country-specific regression coefficient for an AR process with lags that characterizes the speed of 
convergence of the current account to its long run equilibrium 
The exchange rate regime classifications used in columns 2-3 and 4-5 are based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). In columns 4-5, 
their last three classifications are combined. The exchange rate classifications in column 6-7 are based on Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) 
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Table 4: Labor Market Rigidity and Current Account Convergence     
(with CA/GDP convergence speed estimated from a TAR model, quarterly data)    
   b1Q  b1Q  b1Q  b1Q  b1Q  b1Q  b1Q 
Labor market rigidity   0.93 1.008 0.987  1.038  1.004  1.04  0.989 
   (0.464)* (0.527)* (0.518)*  (0.485)* (0.474)* (0.512)* (0.514)* 
Exchange rate: crawling peg     -0.183  -0.248  -0.183  -0.251       
      (0.17)  (0.17)  (0.16)  (0.17)       
Exchange rate: managed float     -0.126  -0.136             
      (0.21)  (0.21)             
Exchange rate: float     (dropped)  (dropped)            
                       
Exchange rate: free falling     -0.248  -0.221             
      (0.18)  (0.18)             
Exchange rate: dual market     -0.198  -0.191             
      (0.35)  (0.34)             
         -0.212  -0.195        Exchange rate: managed float, float, 
free falling or dual market           (0.16)  (0.16)       
Exchange rate: float                 -0.109  -0.057 
                  (0.12)  (0.13) 
Exchange rate: intermediate                 -0.074  -0.012 
                  (0.16)  (0.17) 
Log GDP / capita [10,000US$]        0.16     0.169     0.117 
         (0.12)     (0.11)     (0.11) 
Constant  -0.6 -0.439 -0.487  -0.441  -0.491 -0.548 -0.629 
   (0.077)* (0.153)* (0.155)*  (0.148)* (0.148)* (0.099)* (0.126)* 
Observations  30 30  30 30 30  30  30 
R-squared  0.13 0.2  0.26  0.18  0.25 0.15 0.19 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%         
The dependent variable is a country-specific regression coefficient for a symmetric treshold AR process that characterizes the speed 
of convergence of the current account to its long run equilibrium 
The exchange rate regime classifications used in columns 2-3 and 4-5 are based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). In columns 4-5, 
their last three classifications are combined. The exchange rate classifications in column 6-7 are based on Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) 
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Table 5: Labor Market Rigidity and Current Account Convergence:     
(with CA/GDP convergence speed estimated with a TAR model, annual data)    
   b1A  b1A  b1A  b1A  b1A  b1A  b1A 
Labor market rigidity   0.96 0.99  1.049  1.162  1.204 0.937 1.052 
   (0.505)* (0.565)*  (0.548)* (0.554)*  (0.534)* (0.590) (0.556)* 
Exchange rate: crawling peg     0.063  0.032  0.041  -0.004       
      (0.16)  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.17)       
Exchange rate: managed float     0.013  0.05             
      (0.18)  (0.18)             
Exchange rate: float     -0.698  -0.628             
      (0.354)*  (0.345)*            
Exchange rate: free falling     -0.246  -0.189             
      (0.18)  (0.18)             
Exchange rate: dual market     -0.162  -0.16             
      (0.38)  (0.37)             
         -0.134  -0.078        Exchange rate: managed float, float, 
free falling or dual market           (0.17)  (0.16)       
Exchange rate: float                 -0.068  -0.048 
                  (0.12)  (0.12) 
Exchange rate: intermediate                 0.033  0.053 
                  (0.18)  (0.17) 
Log GDP / capita [10,000US$]        0.283     0.328     0.365 
         (0.161)*    (0.170)*     (0.157)* 
Constant  -0.794 -0.758 -0.865  -0.77  -0.892  -0.776  -0.915 
   (0.085)* (0.139)* (0.148)* (0.146)*  (0.154)*  (0.105)*  (0.116)* 
Observations  42 39 39 39  39  39  39 
R-squared  0.08  0.29  0.35  0.14  0.22 0.1 0.22 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%          
The dependent variable is a country-specific regression coefficient for a symmetric treshold AR process that characterizes the speed 
of convergence of the current account to its long run equilibrium 
The exchange rate regime classifications used in columns 2-3 and 4-5 are based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). In columns 4-5, 
their last three classifications are combined. The exchange rate classifications in column 6-7 are based on Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2002) 
  
  59 
 
 
Table 6: Labor Rigidity and Standard Deviation of (CA/Total Trade)      
   all obs  all obs  all obs  all obs  excl. BRA & NIC excl. BRA & NIC excl. BRA & NIC excl. BRA & NIC
Labor market rigidity   13.712 15.745  12.176 12.509  14.518  15.151  12.93  13.39 
   (6.511)*  (7.403)*  (6.565)*  (6.795)*  (6.215)* (7.170)* (6.421)* (6.312)* 
Exchange rate: crawling peg     6.433  7.068        8.015  7.478    
      (9.83)  (10.01)        (9.29)  (9.51)    
Exchange rate: managed float     6.111           6.691       
      (10.98)           (10.48)       
Exchange rate: float     31.874           28.188       
      (17.144)*           (16.090)*       
Exchange rate: free falling     14.226           5.148       
      (16.35)           (15.92)       
Exchange rate: dual market     -0.282           2.106       
      (23.12)           (21.66)       
      14.701           8.405     Exchange rate: managed float, float, 
free falling or dual market        (10.10)           (10.16)    
Exchange rate: float           1.746           -0.668 
            (7.56)           (6.92) 
Exchange rate: intermediate           1.653           13.815 
            (11.54)           (11.48) 
sd(lnCPI)  9.551  9.944  9.475  9.665  -4.038 -3.484 -3.271 -6.571 
   (1.943)*  (2.083)*  (1.934)*  (2.097)*  (5.18) (5.68) (5.50) (5.69) 
sd(lnGDP) / mean(lnGDP)  -125.662 -181.012  -168.784  -125.979 218.668 222.032 178.874 289.532 
   (84.62)  (134.70)  (91.116)*  (91.36)  (143.98) (201.53) (169.61)  (158.596)* 
Constant  44.657 38.278  37.781 43.566  40.204  32.043  35.26  38.064 
   (6.065)*  (8.855)*  (8.623)*  (6.792)*  (6.377)* (8.898)* (8.464)* (6.901)* 
Observations  42  41  41  41  40 39 39 39 
R-squared  0.46 0.53  0.5  0.47  0.19  0.26  0.2  0.22 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10% 
The dependent variable is the country-specific standard deviation of Current Account / trade for the period from 1980 to 2005 (or all years for which 
data is available within this period) 
The exchange rate regime classifications used in columns 2-3 and 6-7 are based on Reinhart and Rogoff (2004). In columns 3 and 7, their last three 
classifications are combined. The exchange rate classifications in column 4 and 8 are based on Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002) 
sd(lnCPI) is the standard deviation of the natural log of the Consumer Price Index and sd(lnGDP)/mean(lnGDP) is the standard deviation of the 
natural log of GDP divided by the mean of the natural log of GDP for each country over the period from 1980 to 2005. 
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Table 7: List of countries in regressions        
         currency regime         
   quarterly   annual  RR (2004)  LS (2002)  Labor rigidity   
Albania     TAR   float  float  4.9   
Algeria     AR  peg  fixed  12.9   
Armenia  AR, TAR  AR  crawling peg  fixed  2.35   
Azerbaijan, Rep. of     AR  crawling peg  fixed  1.4   
Bangladesh     AR, TAR  crawling peg  float  10.8   
Belarus  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  free falling  float  6.35   
Brazil  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  dual market  float  56.9   
Bulgaria  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  free falling  intermediate  7.8   
Cambodia     AR, TAR  free falling  float  5.9   
China     AR, TAR  peg  fixed  20.7   
Croatia  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  crawling peg  float  4.2   
Czech Republic  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  managed float  fixed  9.55   
Ecuador  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  crawling peg  fixed  14.1   
Egypt     AR, TAR  managed float  fixed  28.1   
El Salvador     AR, TAR  managed float  fixed  3.9   
Estonia  AR, TAR  AR, TAR        11.5   
Georgia  AR, TAR           5.8   
Greece     AR, TAR  crawling peg  intermediate  7.7   
Guatemala  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  crawling peg  float  16.7   
Guyana     TAR  crawling peg  fixed  10.6   
Honduras     AR, TAR  crawling peg  intermediate  14.2   
Hungary  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  crawling peg  fixed  8.8   
India     AR  crawling peg  intermediate  16.7   
Indonesia  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  crawling peg  float  25.9   
Ireland  AR, TAR  AR  managed float  float  9.6   
Kazakhstan  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  peg intermediate  1.65   
Kenya     AR, TAR  managed float  float  22.5   
Korea  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  managed float  float  4.1   
Kyrgyz Republic  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  managed float  fixed  3.5   
Latvia  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  peg  fixed  3.8   
Lithuania AR,  TAR  AR  peg  fixed  8.7   
Madagascar     AR, TAR  managed float  fixed  14.8   
Malaysia  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  free falling  fixed  14.5   
Mali     AR, TAR  crawling peg  intermediate  3.9   
Moldova     AR  crawling peg  fixed  6.7   
Nicaragua     AR, TAR  free falling  float  6.9   
Pakistan     AR, TAR  free falling  float  15   
Philippines  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  crawling peg  fixed  24.7   
Poland  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  free falling  float  21.55   
Portugal  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  free falling  fixed  18.1   
Romania AR,  TAR  AR  peg  float  12.25   
Senegal     AR  managed float  fixed  16.3   
Slovakia  AR, TAR     free falling  float  6   
Slovenia  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  managed float  float  3.6   
South Africa  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  crawling peg  fixed  32.9   
Spain  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  peg  fixed  11.8   
Sri Lanka     AR, TAR  peg  fixed  25.6   
Syrian Arab Republic     AR  managed float  float  33.8   
Thailand  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  peg  fixed  11.4   
Turkey  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  crawling peg  intermediate  10.45   
Uganda     AR  crawling peg  fixed  10.8   
Ukraine  AR, TAR  AR, TAR  managed float  float  6.15   
Vietnam     TAR        10.9   
Zambia     AR, TAR  free falling  float  16.9   
AR and TAR indicate data availability for the regressions based on autoregressive process (AR) and threshold autoregressive process (TAR) Current Account 
convergence coefficients.  
Currency regime reports the classification a country receives in Reinhart-Rogoff (RR 2004) and Yeyati-Sturzenegger (YS 2002) during most of the years between 
1980 and 2005 for which their data is available. If  two different classifications have been maintained for the same number of years, the more recent one is chosen. 
Labor rigidity reports the share of managers ranking labor regulations as a major business constraint in a World Bank Enterprise Survey. 
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Table 8: Description of exchange rate regime classifications in Reinahrt and Rogoff (2004): 
No separate legal tender             
Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement      
Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
 peg  (excluded) 
De facto peg                
Pre announced crawling peg             
Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
De factor crawling peg          
 crawling  peg 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2% 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5% 
Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%     
 managed  float 
Managed floating            
   float  Freely floating                
 free  falling  Freely falling                
 dual  market  Dual market in which parallel market data is missing.       
             
Reference: Reinhart, C. and K. Rogoff (2004): The modern history of exchange rate arrangements: A 
reinterpretation. NBER Working Paper 8963. http://www.nber.org/papers/w8963 
            
            
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2002):            
floating                
intermediate                
fixed (excluded)                
             
Reference: Levy-Yeyati, E. and Frederico Sturzenegger (2002): A de facto classification of exchange rate 
regimes. http://200.32.4.58/~ely/AppendixAER.pdf 
  